After the Soviet Empire

Legacies and Pathways

Edited by

Sven Eliaeson
Lyudmila Harutyunyan
Larissa Titarenko

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON
Foreword XI
Craig Calhoun
Acknowledgements
List of Tables XV
About the Authors
Keynote Address: The Sociology of Empires, Björn Wittrock

PART 1
Utility of the Classics
1 The Significance of M. His Apocryphal Letters, Sven Eliason
2 On some Observation of Social Change Theory: The Cases of Karl-Ludwig Ay
3 Pre- and Post-Revolution and of Social Change, Christopher Schlee
4 Heidegger within the, as a Contemporary Jon Wittrock
5 To Build a Nation: Always, the Transformation of Hedvig Ekerwald
Contents

Foreword xi
Craig Calhoun
Acknowledgements xiv
List of Tables xv
About the Authors xvi
Keynote Address: The International Institute of Sociology and the Sociology of Empires, Civilizations, and Modernities xxı
Björn Wittrock

Introduction: Challenges of the Disappearance of the “Second World” 1
Sven Eliaeson, Lyudmila Harutyunyan and Larissa Titarenko

PART 1
Utility of the Classics

1 The Significance of Myrdal for Post-1989 Transformations: His Apocryphal Letters 29
Sven Eliaeson

2 On some Observations by Max Weber about Long-Term Structural Features of Russian Policy 54
Karl-Ludwig Ay

3 Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Situations. Legitimation of Authority and of Social Change in the Perspective of Classical Sociological Theory: The Cases of Russia and France 64
Christopher Schlembach

4 Heidegger within the Boundaries of Mere Reason? “Nihilism” as a Contemporary Critical Narrative 87
Jon Wittrock

5 To Build a Nation: Alva Myrdal and the Role of Family Politics in the Transformation of Sweden in the 1930s 108
Hedvig Ekerwald
PART 2
Rethinking the Legacy of the Second World

6 Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Social Sciences 135
   Nikolai Genov

7 Decommunisation and Democracy: Transitional Justice in Post-communist Central-Eastern Europe 165
   Adam Czarnota

8 The Large Second World and the Necessary Shifts in Research Approaches in Macrosocial Dynamics 184
   Nikolai S. Rozov

9 Zig-Zag Post-Soviet Paths to Democracy 199
   Larissa Titarenko

PART 3
The Caucasus: Armenia as a Case Study of the Implosion of the Soviet Empire

10 After the Empire: The Migration in the Post-Soviet Space 229
   Lyudmila Harutyunyan and Maria Zaslavskaya

11 The Geography of Nationalism in Nagorno-Karabakh: Post-Soviet Reality as Post-Colonial Reality 243
   Antranig Kasbarian

12 Symbolic Geography: Geography as a Symbol in the Post-Soviet-Soviet South Caucasus 250
   Hayk Demoyan

13 Playing Democracy: Some Peculiarities of Political Mentality and Behavior in the Post-Soviet Countries 264
   Arthur Atanesyan

14 Globalization and Neo-liberalism: Their Opponents and Their Application to Armenia 273
   Levon Chorbajian

PART 4
 Widening the Horizon

15 Patterns of Contentment 285
   Henryk Domański

16 (Im)Migrants’ Diverse Ideas and Practices 310
   Ewa Morawska

17 The Past as Present: Politics of History 322
   Igor Torbakov

18 Varieties of Cosmopolitanism 336
   Klaus Müller

Index 393
15 European Values and Cultural Identity in the Context of Social-psychological Transformations. Case of Armenia 296
  Gohar Shahnazaryan

PART 4
Widening the Horizons

16 Patterns of Contentious Activity 311
  Henryk Domarński

17 (Im)Migrants' Diverse Identities and Their Impact on Host-Society Ideas and Practices of National Membership 336
  Ewa Morawska

18 The Past as Present: Foreign Relations and Russia's Politics of History 358
  Igor Torbakov

19 Varieties of Cosmopolitanism 381
  Klaus Müller

Index 393
CHAPTER 13

Playing Democracy: Some Peculiarities of Political Mentality and Behavior in the Post-Soviet Countries

Arthur Atanesyan

The modern experience within most of the post-Soviet countries shows that democratic procedures, initially and optimistically copied from Western countries, do not work as they are designed to. In most of these countries, democracy as an ideology and mechanism is misused by the ruling groups seeking to be reelected in perpetuity, for the reproduction of the same elite in a wide or narrow sense (from family to political party). The paradox stems from the present condition of the political culture in the post-Soviet societies, as well as specifics of social structure. These issues were examined separately and at the same time in connection with each other before adopting democracy in its pure form. However, until recently research papers on the post-Soviet democracies present only post-hoc analyses: democracy was adopted and certainly some processes of adaptation have taken place. The main issue to understand with regard to the peculiarities of the post-Soviet democracies is: what has been adapted to what—specifics of local societies been adapted to universal principles of democracy or vice versa?

First of all, one of the local misperceptions about democracy is that democracy is basically a political phenomenon. Accordingly, democracy means not only political institutions, including parties, electoral procedures, and norms. Armenia and most of the other post-Soviet countries went in this direction and quite quickly created all the necessary political formalities for the coming democracy. A couple of decades have passed, and now most post-soviet regimes may be called “national models of democracy,” or, universally, there is no democracy in those countries at all. The perception that democracy is basically a political issue and that political institutions and processes are enough to have democracy is wrong and a fatally misleading way of thinking commonly shared by the first-generation and used by next generation post-soviet political elites.

The point is that democracy needs to be adopted not only by political institutions, but also and firstly by society as a system initial to the state, if with its specific structures, cultural traditions, ethical norms, and
peculiarities of Political the Post-Soviet

The post-Soviet countries show that and optimistically copied democratic models were adapted in connection with the political culture in the post-Soviet structure. These issues should be in connection with each other, and form. However, until recently, most democracies present only post-script, usually some processes of adaptation stand with regard to the peculiarities that have been adapted to what—have the universal principles of democracies about democracy is that democracy means freedom, electoral procedures, and legality. Soviet countries went in this direction, and necessary political formalities for which have passed, and now most of these countries at all. The presumption that political institutions and rules wrong and a fatally misleading way generation and used by next generation are adopted not only by political institutions and system initial to the state. If societies, ethical norms, and national or ethnic peculiarities, is not ready (or willing) to adopt “a child of democracy,” it may nevertheless be accepted on a secondary level, that is, by state only as a step-child may be being tolerated, but not loved. Actually, the “secret” of “national models of democracies” in the post-Soviet space is that democracy is not loved there, even if being tolerated, like in Georgia or Ukraine, and is sometimes being beaten and punished, like in Russia or Turkmenistan.

Again, the “secret” is that societies may or may not accept democracy even when seeing its advantages. For example, to understand the political processes in the post-Soviet countries, it is important to appreciate the cult of the family, a tradition-based, deep, and essential component of social life. This historically evolved cult is supported by the experience of many nations, including Russia and some in Central Asia, which needed to survive in the wild environment of the deserts and taiga. The populations of these regions lived in family units which tended to be enlarged in order to be stronger and more functional. The social structure based on the family or clan and their interrelations determines modern political life in these countries and societies. Family interests are a major concern for political leaders and understandable to common citizens, who would behave in the same way if they had become leaders. As for most of the leaders on the post-Soviet space, politics is a very useful arena to protect personal and family interests using public needs and manipulating public goals. Oppositions perceive things the same way; they just wait for their turn to protect the interest of the enlarged family-parties or clans—using a different ideology. In order to be strong and to solve problems, it is necessary to be a member of any group, particularly political, to protect personal rights and the rights of relatives should a given party come to power (see more in: Sahakyan, Atanesyan 2006).

The tolerance shown by the population regarding such phenomena as personification of elections and party structure, as well as clan and community-based principles of organization of political life, might be understood because each member of society has the potential ability to feel and behave as if part of the same political culture where family and community are still the natural players.

One of the essential elements of the mentality and behavior of post-Soviet citizens is that their participation in the electoral process is not congruent with the rational behavior or rules of rationality assumed in rational choice theories. Such rational choice is based on individual interests, and participation in elections and voting must be justified by the interests of the individual and society. If the interests are not understood and defined in terms of the individual, there is no participation and no action.

Moreover, another theory related to marketing, and specifically to political marketing, offers some basic rules of political behavior that apply equally to
any type of political action, as well as electoral behavior. According to this theory, people act in a similar way when buying goods on the market, selecting candidates for marriage, or electing candidates for political positions. In each case, people select the outcome of their choice using their personal scale of interests and their individual taste to explain their choice. Here individuals do not accept that someone else compels them to perform an action or determines their choice without taking into consideration their own preferences or tastes.

These two theories determine our electoral behavior as individual, interest-based choice aimed at maximizing our outputs, whereas the input during elections by each citizen as a part of the electorate is always minimal—to get to the voting booth and put a piece of marked paper into a ballot box. This input is less perceptible for the individual than paying money to buy something in the market. According to these two theories, people never elect bad candidates because no one, being rational (or being called rational), is ready to pay for bad products; no one will vote for a bad candidate if it means suffering because of such a choice four or five years down the road.

Western electorates behave this way, and these two theories of political behavior stem from the exercises of Western theoreticians and are based on the historical experience in Western democracies. Eurasians, including Armenians, Georgians, Russians, and, partly, the citizens of the Asian republics in the post-Soviet space, behave in a different way, demonstrating another type of rationality. In the context of these societies; being rational means being able to solve short-term problems. When offered a bribe to elect a candidate you have never seen or heard, and sometimes even knowing that the candidate involved in crime or is a Mafioso, you accept the bribe, go and mark his name, and elect him to govern you. The Armenian electorate is mostly ready to accept bribes, and leaders are ready to offer electoral bribes again and again, and such a horrific harmony determines electoral campaigns in our countries. Each citizen accepting a bribe knows that he or she gets minimal benefit, while paying the ultimate price with regard to his or her individual political rights. People behave in such a way, and do so consciously, because sometimes having five or ten dollars today is perceived as being more important (and even more perceptible) than waiting for a stable income tomorrow. Considering the low level of income of a major part of the population, people are ready to accept such a situation and to vote accordingly. This is rational, too.

Such short-term rationality, with extremes like bribe-taking or corruption in general, very often contradicts the moral principles or obligations that post-Soviet people mostly have and take as important. People understand that it is wrong to accept $20 dollars and vote for any candidate in a long-term perspective, and that where all the candidates sense. And, the context partly be solved by the population that they but vote for the one money from one candidate those politicians who and those who do not are worthy of being considered attitudes to the voting universal sense, but it in other words, what personal interests in a social logic of corruptive democratic electoral behavior.

The question here knowing that voters not to win? The answer is that pay for votes performance, elected, because they time are free from social being elected for a first being elected a second time, they start to think and democracy has created presidents and other office of an absence of a bribe-giving and non-directed, selfish and who are aware of their chances for bribes and will not decide money from one candidate do so even if it is very and a way of thinking to gets the position with voters and goes but she/he/ she/pays 20 dollars voluntaryism and selfish...
behavior. According to this view, goods on the market, selection of candidates for political positions, in their choice using their personal scale in their choice. Here individuals perform an action or determine their own preferences.

Another behavior as individual, interests, whereas the input during elect is always minimal—to get to the point into a ballot box. This input is the money to buy something in the people never elect bad candidates (rational), is ready to pay for bad if it means suffering because of it.

These two theories of political theorists and are based on democracies. Eurasians, including citizens of the Asian republics in a way, demonstrating another type of being rational means being able to a bribe to elect a candidate you even knowing that the candidate is the bribe, go and mark his name. electorate is mostly ready to accept bribes again and again, and such spains in our countries. Each citizens gets minimal benefit, while paying individual political rights. People because sometimes having five or important (and even more perceptive) reason. Considering the low level of people are ready to accept such a rational, too.

Bribe-taking or corruption is a principle or obligations that are important. People understand the for any candidate in a long-term perspective, and that it is wrong from a moral point of view, but in conditions where all the candidates are equally unacceptable, accepting 20 dollars makes sense. And, the contradiction between morality and the short-term logic may partly be solved by the way a local candidate, speaking on TV, proposes to the population that they should accept pre-electoral bribes from any candidate but vote for the one who was initially acceptable to them. As he said, to take money from one candidate and to vote for another is not immoral, because those politicians who are ready to bribe voters are not worthy of being elected, and those who do not pay for votes are expected to pay by their good work and are worthy of being elected. This formula explains some specifics of domestic attitudes to the voting procedure that are incompatible with democracy in a universal sense, but is very logical and normal from a relativistic point of view. In other words, what domestic voters do is a sort of compromise between personal interests in a short and long perspective, between morality, and the local logic of corruptive behavior that may be called a “national model of democratic electoral behavior.”

The question here is why those who pay for votes continue to do so, even knowing that voters may take their money and then vote for a different candidate? The answer is that in many cases those who paid and those who did not pay for votes perform equally badly when doing their job after they have been elected, because they have reached their position and for a certain period of time are free from social control. Paraphrasing President Clinton’s words, after being elected for a first term, presidents basically think about and work towards being elected a second term, and only after being elected a second time do they start to think and work for their country and people. Of course, American democracy has created very useful mechanisms of checks and balances to prevent presidents and others from becoming self-directed in their job, but in the case of an absence of such mechanisms in the post-soviet countries, both bribe-giving and non-giving candidates are basically personally and family-directed, selfish and voluntary. That is why those who pay for votes are well aware of their chances of getting elected; most people will take pre-electoral bribes and will not do what the local politician proposes, that is, to accept money from one candidate and vote for a different one. Most local people will not do so even if it is very logical, because they know from personal experience and a way of thinking that they share with their local politicians that any leader who gets the position immediately shuts down pre-electoral communication with voters and goes his own way. So, to be logical is to accept pre-electoral bribes and to vote for the bribe-giving candidate, because what is certain is that he/she pays 20 dollars, which is a certain and secured pay-off for future voluntarism and selfishness. What, for example, Armenians used to say in such
situations in everyday slang sounds something like: "It is worthy even to cut off the dog’s fur."

The next specific feature of the “national models of democracy” in the post-Soviet countries is that an essential part of the new “democratic” elite consists of members of the Soviet nomenclature, reelected during the post-Soviet electoral campaigns. These people succeeded in being reelected because they had the same mentality as most of the population and shared the essential components of the dominant ideological stereotypes that survived in the context of democratization. Besides that, some old communists were successfully converted into new democrats by using the material resources and social capital created during Soviet times, including a misuse of nomenclature positions and corruption. One of the critical questions here is if it is possible to drive an old car in order to get to the destination that is too far from the place where the car was produced. The answer might be yes, but the fact that an old car is mostly driven by an old driver, means that the way there is not always secure. Accordingly, the post-Soviet systems driven toward democracy by old drivers may not be considered the best option.

What we can see in the post-Soviet space is that voters who are over fifty basically prefer the Soviet elite to the new and younger candidates, because they consider the old guard as having more experience in governing large and complicated bureaucratic systems. Additionally, new leaders, educated in Western countries and having idealistic views on democratization, are considered naïve in their home countries. Still, a segment of the population is uncomfortable with the former Soviet leaders who play democracy without having a real feel for it, and prefers young leaders educated in liberal values.

These two types of electorate attempt to reform political, social, and economic systems based on conservative (pro-Soviet) and liberal (democratic) values. These attempts are sometimes headed by authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin in Russia, Nursultan Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan, Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, Heydar Aliyev and then Ilkham Aliyev (the son) in Azerbaijan, or less authoritarian and powerful ones, such as Robert Kocharyan and then Serge Sarkisyan in Armenia. Some reforms succeed due to the strong authoritarian power and the will of these leaders. Economic growth is perceptible in Kazakhstan, and such growth is perceptible a part of Nazarbaev’s official strategy and ideology. Authoritarianism functions as a system of transition from Soviet totalitarianism to democracy. This scheme seemed to work in Putin’s Russia as well, but Putin was unable to get rid of his ruling style based on Soviet-traditions and moreover of a Russian way of life and thinking common to most parts of the population who, according to sociological polls, want their leader to have a “strong fist.” Contemporary Russians
want a "Tsar," as it was in the past, and Putin gave them a Tsar. Again, when Dmitry Medvedev was the democratically elected president, but Putin is still the Tsar, paradoxically being democratically elected as well; and, as Russians were jokingly saying, "Medvedev works as the president under Putin’s rule." Returning to the initial question concerning the possibility of universal democracy in local societies, one may see that even if democracy is institutionally possible in countries such as Russia, democracy in its universal sense is impossible on the society level and incompatible with national values and the "Russian way."

Moreover, in Russia, Armenia, or Georgia there is a new generation of leaders with old stereotypes regarding the rules of game; that is, the smaller the opposition, the more secure the power, with fewer external players in politics, and the greater the influence of family and friendship in the political structure, the more secure and predictable the political future of the power holders. And, having two types of leaders in the post-Soviet countries—former communist leaders converted into new democrats, and newly educated young democrats—in most cases, on the top and the middle levels, the output is the same, that is, the absence or only symbolic role of political opposition, the concentration of political and economic power and resources in the hands of the same clan or set of families, and a lack of dialogue between the population and the power holders. Even when there are opposition activities like those in Armenia during the presidential elections in 2008, or in Ukraine, every time it becomes obvious that the opposition has no political culture, no realistic program for reforms, no will and wish to cooperate with others; so, the role of the opposition in the post-Soviet countries has always been more or less destructive. People, being deeply disappointed, are often forced to tolerate various types of converse of the same power, because, as people say, "an old friend is better than two new ones."

Some important segments of the population in Armenia and other post-Soviet countries do not believe in democracy, considering it an ideological myth imported from the West and artificially injected into their societies. People do not trust democracy because they are suspicious of big ideas. In these ideas, the citizens of the former Soviet Union recognize the same major mechanisms that dominated society and made people do what the Communist Party wanted them to do. Now the process of democratization touches the same nerves; people are again being asked to follow an ideology, albeit a new one. The post-Soviet state again dominates society, just as it was during Soviet times, and is associated with communism, though being called "a democracy." The indifference towards it is a normal reaction. People do not think they need ideologies; rather, what they need is real improvement in their lives.
Moreover, having such dysfunctional examples as the former Italian Prime-Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who has accumulated billions in his accounts, using money and authority for his personal entertainment, and being untouched by society (with the exception of some aggressive brutality directed towards him from the population), people in the post-Soviet space compare his behavior with those referred to as authoritarian non-democratic leaders, and there is indeed not much of a difference, which is disappointing in itself.

In the case of Azerbaijan, where the two Alyevs (father and then son), as well as other family members including Ilham Alyev’s wife Mehriban Alyeva and their two adult daughters rule the country, this saying is directly useful. Political processes in Azerbaijan are still based on the traditions of a family-rulled country where the political authority introduced by the Alyev family being flourished from the Nakhijevan clan reproduces itself using the democratic procedures of elections and referendums. The governing president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Alyev, the son of the high ranking Soviet political party leader and then the most successful leader of Azerbaijan, Heydar Alyev, came to power because of his father, and he was elected twice, mostly owing to his father’s authority and oil resources, which the Alyev family has possessed since the Azeri national resources were privatized. In March 2009, Ilham Alyev launched a referendum to change the Constitution and to adapt it to his wishes to govern forever, and according to Azerbaijani official information, 92% of the population voted for Ilham Alyev’s right to get reelected as many times as he wishes.

Again, there is obviously an return to pre-democratic conditions in Azerbaijan which demonstrate that society’s domestic approach to reforms: it is not the previous regime but democracy itself with its formal procedures that is being reformed in Azerbaijan, and some other post-Soviet countries, in accordance with the domestic political culture.

In some regimes, like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Russia, authoritarian leaders with a tendency towards totalitarianism use natural and predominantly energy resources in order to attain economic growth and promise future prosperity to their societies, and most of the population does prefer economic welfare to political freedoms. Moreover, the people witnessed only declarations of democracy, without experiencing its benefits. The international political arena is full of declarations of human rights and the proper rhetoric; mass media and leaders of political and non-governmental organizations proclaim the superiority of a system that protects human rights, while only the rights of the elites are actually protected. The majority of these populations considers democracy an ideology created by the elite and aimed at protecting the interests of that elite while manipulating the majority. And even in so-called stable Western democracies, Marxist explanations of the elite-benefited nature of democracy is again in use. Most of them are being partly or completely well from the Soviet population towards democracy if the situation continues.

Again, the major problems space, initiated from the outset, have had no stable “democracy” was quickly grounded on the society’s traditions and attitudes (like in the so-called “democratic” arrangements and liberties.

Of course, those who lack the feedback which the society level must be filled. However, in the post-Soviet space, initiated by states and established institutions, these people often know resources of real power in international grants and human rights development. To appear in their titles and titles of the most human rights, developing countries do not care about real reforms or oppose the ruling power. They see the way to receive short-term benefits of groups of people.

To conclude, the most probable ability of the so-called “non-democratic” countries is negative, because the elite-driven reforms are important in this context. If reforms include only formal based and not being based on structure and ties, Paraphrase (Zakaria 2003), in most of these real democracies, if any.
The former Italian Prime-
minister in his accounts, using
ability directed towards him
the traditions of a family-
led by the Ayev family
the governing president of
Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev,
came to his family's wishes.
3 March 2009, Ilham Aliyev
adapts it to his wishes.
In Azerbaijan, 92% of the popula-
tion, according to the
Azerbaijan, and Russia
militarism use natural and
human economic growth and
most of the population does
not see, the people witnessed
the benefits. The Interna-
tional human rights and the pro-
tection of human rights, when
The majority of these popu-
lar by the elite and aimed at
benefits. The People's Party of
Azerbaijan, which was founded
by the Aliyev family, has
the elite and the people.

The former Italian Prime-

minister in his accounts, using
ability directed towards him
the traditions of a family-
led by the Ayev family
the governing president of
Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev,
came to his family's wishes.
3 March 2009, Ilham Aliyev
adapts it to his wishes.
In Azerbaijan, 92% of the popula-
tion, according to the
Azerbaijan, and Russia
militarism use natural and
human economic growth and
most of the population does
not see, the people witnessed
the benefits. The Interna-
tional human rights and the pro-
tection of human rights, when
The majority of these popu-
lar by the elite and aimed at
benefits. The People's Party of
Azerbaijan, which was founded
by the Aliyev family, has
the elite and the people.

elite benefited nature of politics, including democracy, is popular and once
again in use. Most of the people in the post-Soviet states feel as if they are
being partly or completely misled and deceived, though knowing Marxist the-
ory well from the Soviet ideology and propaganda. The indifference of
the population towards democracy might be transformed into aggressive behavior,
if the situation continues to evolve in the same direction.

Again, the major problem here is that democratic reforms in the post-Soviet
space, initiated from the top and supported from the bottom only at the begin-
ing, have had no stable feedback from the society level, so that the slogan
"democracy" was quickly made by the elites into a legitimating mechanism for
their monopoly over scenarios of future reforms, and those scenarios lack real
grounding on the society level, or are based on non-democratic domestic tradi-
tions and attitudes (like in the Asian countries). Those scenarios of reform that
are called "democratic" are actually a far cry from democracy as a set of rights
and liberties.

Of course, those who know at least the basics of democracy may say that
the lack of feedback when it comes to reforms towards democracy from the
society level must be filled by the NGO sector and active social initiatives.
However, in the post-Soviet reality, there are thousands of NGOs formally reg-
istered by states and established by people really indifferent to democracy.
These people often know the rules of game and the way to gain access to
resources of real power in their countries, so their NGOs mostly benefit from
international grants and have non-conflicting strategies of adaptation to the
ruling regimes. To appear more effective, those NGOs necessarily include in
their titles and titles of their projects such shouting words as democracy, free-
dom, human rights, development, liberal, dialogue, but actually, most of them
do not care about real reforms and fear being canceled by the state if they
oppose the ruling power. Their real role is basically perceived in the following
way: to receive short-term grants and organize senseless training for small
groups of people.

To conclude, the most probable answer to the basic question about the pos-
sibility of the so-called "national models of democracy" in the post-Soviet
countries is negative, because there was and still is no social participation in
the elite driven reforms and processes. Additionally, what seems to be more
important in this context is that in most of the post-Soviet countries those
reforms include only formal democratic elements in both cases, of being
based and not being based on domestic culture, mentality, perceptions, social
structure and ties. Paraphrasing the title of famous book by Fareed Zakaria
(Zakaria 2003), in most of the post-Soviet countries, there is transition to illib-
eral democracy, if any.
Bibliography


CHAPTER 14

Globalization and Their Applications

Levon Chorbajian

Since the early 1970s with the rise of international capitalism, the world economy and society have been accompanied by the rise of the Third World in the United States, and the United States, and Eastern Europe and the European allies themselves opened up for present and consider the nature of globalization and ideological nature, i.e., major claims about globalization and neoliberalism reason to be skeptical on globalization and major reasons reason to be skeptical on globalization and major claims about globalization and neoliberalism.

As Objective Policies

If one takes the long view of the history with the migrations through conquest, culture through conquest, was greatly accelerated, course of little more than the conquest of Europe out of its boundaries, colonial conquest and conquest of the Middle East, central and dates from the end of the 1970s. In this latest wave have been integrated into the economy, new materials and cash crops...